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1.1  Introduction 
The property-casualty insurance industry is characterized by an “insurance 
cycle”-periods  of high prices and rationing followed by periods of  expanding 
coverage and lower prices. One might expect that the high-price, restricted- 
supply phase would be short lived due to competition between insurers for 
profitable new business. In fact, this phase is persistent enough that it can be 
observed in annual data. A number of possible explanations for this phenome- 
non have been suggested. In this paper we test the hypothesis that these epi- 
sodes are due to .temporary capital shortages that reduce the industry’s ability 
to back risk (Winter 1988; Gron 1990). Such shocks to industry net work may 
arise either from reductions in asset value (e.g., a drop in the stock market) or 
from unanticipated increases in claims payments. 
Past empirical studies of the cycle provide evidence that is consistent with 
the capital shortage hypothesis: industry capacity measures have a significant, 
negative relationship with price-claims margins, and large increases in price- 
claims margins are followed by increases in industry capacity as measured by 
net worth (Winter 1991a; Gron 1994a, 1994b). Yet this evidence does not ex- 
plain why capital shortages would not be quickly corrected by an infusion of 
new capital, particularly when profit margins are high. Unlike many industries, 
there appears to be no reason for a significant lag between the arrival of new 
capital and increased capacity. That is, the required “time to build” is short 
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because financial capital serves primarily as a buffer against high claims costs 
or poor asset performance.' This intuition is captured in models of insurance 
pricing without capital market frictions where price is equal to the present 
value of expected claims (see, e.g., Fairley 1979; Hill 1979; Myers and Cohn 
1987). In order to explain periods of unusually high profitability, any model of 
capital constraints for this industry must rely on some mechanism that delays 
capital inflows when industry net worth is low.2 
A primary reliance on internally generated funds to finance business expan- 
sion is not special to the property-casualty industry. Most firms prefer to use 
internally generated funds since they avoid the costs associated with external 
financing. Models attempting to explain this phenomenon typically postulate 
that capital market imperfections such as asymmetric information increase the 
cost of external funds. Thus, even if insurers can earn what ?ppear to be abnor- 
mal returns on new policies, the cost of raising external funds may exceed the 
potential benefits from the high returns earned on new policies. The question, 
then, is whether plausible issue costs can explain the persistence of  high- 
price periods. 
To date there has been little empirical research that systematically examines 
insurer financing decisions in relation to periods with and without likely capi- 
tal shortages. This paper provides such an overview of insurer financing behav- 
ior and its relation to the cycle. In particular, we look for evidence that might 
support the notion that the cost of  external capital for the property-casualty 
industry is  sufficiently high  to  explain the persistence of  high-price, con- 
strained-output periods. Much of  our focus is on stock insurers since these 
insurers should have greater access to external capital and because of data 
availability: 
Section 1.2 begins with a description of  the cyclic nature of the insurance 
industry over the period 1967-90,  using aggregate  industry and financial statis- 
tics for a sample of stock insurers. Since reducing cash payments to stockhold- 
ers is an alternative to issuing debt or equity, we look for evidence of changes 
in payout policy over the cycle. In section 1.3 we describe the sample of public 
debt and equity issues used in the analysis of external financing and summarize 
the evidence on how much insurers raise in the capital markets, what types of 
instruments are used, whether reliance on external sources has changed over 
time, and how financing varies with the relative abundance of  capital in the 
industry and overall market conditions. 
Evidence on the cost of external financing is examined in section 1.4.  A key 
indicator of this cost is the stock price reaction to a security issue announce- 
ment since it reflects the revision in the market's expectations about the value 
of an issuing firm. To evaluate the hypothesis that external finance is unusually 
1. It has been suggested, however, that in the aftermath of  a major disaster, the disruption in 
2. See also the models of  insurance pricing with possible capital shortages by  Cummins and 
established policyholder relationships  may result in a longer time to build. 
Danzon (1991). Cagle and Hanington (1995), and Doherty and Gwen  (1995). 7  External Financing and Insurance Cycles 
costly for the property-casualty industry, we measure the stock price reaction 
to insurer announcements of equity issues and debt issues and compare these 
price changes to those for other industries. We focus primarily on equity issues 
since these are a relatively costly form of external finance. Asquith and Mullins 
(1986) find that industrial firms announcing an equity issue experience a stock 
price decline of 2-3  percent on average, which for a typical issuer represents 
a drop in market value equal to about 20 percent of the total cash rai~ed.~  If 
stock price reactions to stock issues by property-casualty insurers are unusu- 
ally negative, this would provide evidence that insurers face a relatively high 
cost of external funds.4 Section 1.5 concludes with a discussion of explanations 
for the insurance cycle that are alternatives to the capital shortage hypothesis. 
1.2  Industry Measures 
In  this section we summarize the performance of  stock property-casualty 
insurers over the period 1967-90.  Using data from a variety of  sources, the 
time path of profitability, capital structure, and payout policy is related to the 
insurance cycle. 
1.2.1 
Insurance market conditions are usually described in terms of  accounting 
profitability. Industry profitability, measured as net income divided by reve- 
nues, is graphed in figure l.  l for the 1967-93  peri~d.~  A change from declining 
to  increasing profitability marks the beginning of  a high-price, restricted- 
output period.6 During these years, there are three episodes of  high price and 
restricted output: 1969-70,  1975-76,  and 1985-86.  Premium price changes, 
net worth series, and stock indexes follow a similar pattern. Gron (1994b) finds 
that large increases in price-claims indexes coincide with changes from de- 
Measures of Profitability, Capacity, and Prices 
3. One explanation for the price drop is that the riskiness of equity exacerbates problems of 
asymmetric information  since purchasers anticipate issues by  predominantly  overvalued firms 
(Myers and Majluf 1984). 
4. This research also contributes to the literature on the link between firm financing and real 
market outcomes, much of which explores the effect of decreased liquidity on real firm decisions. 
Recent theoretical and empirical work (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; Chevalier and 
Scharfstein 1994) suggests that competition among firms is weaker, and price-noncapital  cost 
margins are higher, when firms and the industry are more liquidity constrained. A similar pattern 
is observed in the property-casualty  industry: when industry capacity is low the price of insurance 
relative to noncapital costs is higher, perhaps reflecting a temporary increase in the opportunity 
cost of capital. 
5. Unless otherwise noted, the data described here are from Best’s Aggregates and Averages 
(A. M. Best Company, various years). 
6. Price and quantity data would be preferable for describing market conditions, but they are 
not available. Other profitability series show the same time-series pattern (Stewart 1984). Due to 
accounting practices, income from insurance premiums tends to reflect pricing conditions for the 
previous as well as the current accounting period. Therefore, the greatest increase in profitability 
will not necessarily coincide with the largest increase in prices. Anecdotal evidence confirms that 
pricing changes occur around the time accounting profitability changes. Gron (1994a) and Cum- 
mins and Outreville (1986) provide useful discussions of insurance accounting. 8  Anne Gron and Deborah Lucas 
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Fig. 1.2  Industry capacity 
creasing to increasing accounting profitability. Large increases in the price- 
claims margin occur in 1969-70,  1975-76,  and 1985. 
Capacity is related to the volume of policies that can be supported by  the 
industry's capital base. Although a precise regulatory measure of capacity does 
not exist, the time-series pattern of  various proxies for industry capacity are 
consistent with the capital shortage hypothesis (see fig. 1.2). For instance, here 
industry capacity is measured as the ratio of industry net worth to its five-year 
historical average. The series has relative minima at 1969, 1974, and  1984, 
suggesting that capacity is low immediately before price-claims margins rise. 
The figure also reveals that large declines in capacity immediately precede 
low-capacity years.7 
7. Net worth divided by a historical average is also used in Winter (1991) and in Gron (1994b). 
A different measure of capacity, industry net worth divided by GNF', displays a similar pattern and 9  External Financing and Insurance Cycles 
Fig. 1.3  Property-casualty  stock returns, 1970-87 
Finally, figure 1.3 displays annual returns for A. M. Best's property-casualty 
company stock index for the years 1970-87.8 Data for more recent years are 
unavailable. The stock return series shows a pattern similar to the other indus- 
try  aggregates: returns of  property-casualty firms reach relative minima in 
1974 and 1984, with substantial increases in annual returns in the years imme- 
diately following these relative minima. 
For comparison to the above aggregates, we also collected data on a sample 
of large property-casualty and multiline insurers listed in quarterly and/or an- 
nual Compustat for the  1970-92  period. Data for 38 different insurers are 
available from this source, but not all insurers were listed for the entire period. 
Data for 1970-72  are particularly sparse, and for the remainder of the 1970s 
there are an average of 21 observations per year. Observations per year increase 
to about 30 in the early 1980s and to 35 by the end of the period.¶ 
Figure 1.4 shows the annual means of income normalized by sales or assets 
for this Compustat sample. The pattern found in the aggregate industry ratios 
is also seen here. Clearly, 1985 was a year of particularly low income. Income 
was relatively low as well in 1970 and 1974. The mean annual ratio of liabili- 
ties to assets is generally increasing over the period. While the ratio declines 
somewhat in the latter part of the 1970s, there is really only one distinct fea- 
ture, which is the significant increase in liabilities relative to assets in 1985. 
1.2.2  Payout Policy 
Internally generated funds represent by far the largest source of capital for 
U.S. corporations.I0 The primary advantage of  internal financing is that it 
is used in Gron (1994a, 1994b). For a more detailed exploration of the capacity-price time-series 
relationship, see Gron (1994b). 
8. Stock index data are from van Aartrijk (1985) and A. M. Best Company (1988). 
9. Two firms had negative equity for one year: Mission Insurance in 1985 and Ambase in 1990. 
Mission was declared insolvent and liquidated in 1985. Ambase was reorganized in 1990. These 
observations were dropped from the sample. 
10. The OECD reports that internal funds comprise almost 80 percent of  financing for U.S. 















avoids the direct and indirect costs associated with issuing new  securities. 
Clearly, one way for firms to increase available internal funds is to cut back on 
payouts to shareholders, that is, by reducing dividends or repurchases. While 
stock repurchases are considered discretionary, managers appear reluctant to 
reduce dividends except when under strong financial pressure to do so, in part 
because of  the negative stock price reaction to dividend cuts. As a result, we 
expect to see an overall reduction in dividend growth rates and repurchase 
activity during periods of  industry-wide capital shortages, with a potentially 
larger response of repurchases than of dividends. 
One measure of  dividend policy is the payout ratio, which measures the 
dollar dividend per share divided by earnings per share. Figure 1.5 plots the 
payout ratio for the period 1972-90 using data from quarterly Compustat on 
property-casualty insurers, as described above. Notice that the payout ratio 11  External Financing and Insurance Cycles 
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Fig. 1.5  Dividend payout ratio 
Fig. 1.6  Growth in stockholder dividends 
hovers between 25 and 60 percent for most of this period, with a noticeable 
increase in the payout ratio in the two years preceding the earnings crash of 
1984-85. As in other industries, it appears that insurers follow a fairly smooth 
payout policy. The exception to this was the period 1984-85,  at which time 
dividends clearly fell by much less than earnings. If  1975-76  and 1985-86 are 
taken to be periods of capital shortage, the graph is consistent with the idea 
that payout ratios were somewhat reduced in the years immediately following 
these episodes, perhaps in an effort to rebuild capital. Similar conclusions can 
be drawn from the time-series behavior of the dividend yield (dividend divided 
by price). 
To  look more closely at these changes, figure 1.6 shows the proportional 12  Anne Gron and Deborah Lucas 
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Fig. 1.7  Repurchases (as percentage of stock outstanding) 
changes in aggregate stockholder  dividends over the 1967-92 period." Consis- 
tent with the idea that  dividends are only reduced under  duress, negative 
growth is rarely observed. In fact, years with dividend cuts coincide with turn- 
ing points in the cycle-1970,  1974-75, and 1984-suggesting  some attempt 
was made to conserve scarce capital. 
As discussed above, an alternative to dividends is to use share repurchases 
to distribute cash. Although still less important than dividends, the volume of 
repurchases by  U.S. firms has grown steadily over the past several decades. 
Figure 1.7 plots equity repurchases and issues over the 1972-90 period, also 
using data from quarterly Compustat for firms classified as property-casualty 
insurers. The data again support the idea that insurers were trying to rebuild 
capital following the 1984-85  shock. In particular, no repurchases for the 32 
firms in the sample were reported from 1985-87,  but repurchase activity re- 
sumed in  1988 and thereafter. Interpreting repurchase activity for the earlier 
period is more problematic because repurchases are less prevalent and because 
data are available for only  12 firms. The increase in repurchase activity in 
1983-84 is consistent with the rise in dividend payout ratios in the same years, 
but it is somewhat surprising in light of the drop in net worth that appears at 
about the same time. 
1.3  Firm Financing Behavior 
The statistics presented in the previous section suggest that profitability in 
the property-casualty  industry has varied markedly over time, with episodes of 
high prices and restricted output in  1969-70,  1975-76,  and most notably in 
11. The data are from BestSAggregutes undAveruges. The pre-1983 series consists of aggregate 
stock company measures. The post-1983 series consists of consolidated data for all insurers. The 
large increase in  1969 is most likely a one-time adjustment due to the passage of  the Holding 
Company Act. 13  External Financing and  Insurance Cycles 
1985-86. Although payouts to shareholders grew at a slower rate in the high- 
price, restricted-output phases, the large fluctuations in capital do not appear 
to be substantially offset by efforts to conserve internally generated funds via 
changes in payout policy. 
An alternative to financing with retained earnings is to raise capital exter- 
nally. Here we focus on public debt and equity issues as sources of external 
funds and examine how the volume of new issues in the property-casualty in- 
dustry has varied over time and with market conditions. We  concentrate on 
debt and  equity because of  data availability and because these sources are 
likely to account for a large fraction of external financing. It should be noted, 
however, that other sources of external finance, including bank loans, private 
placements of debt and equity, and other types of securities such as convertible 
bonds or warrants, are also potential sources of capital. 
1.3.1  Data 
We  obtained all SEC-registered debt and equity announcement and issue 
dates for the property-casualty industry from the Securities Data Company 
(SDC). Since 1970, this sample includes 171 equity issues by  100 different 
property-casualty  companies, reinsurers, and holding companies, totaling over 
$1 1.5 billion. We  also obtained information on companies in these categories 
for 142 debt issues that yielded over $13.6 billion. The data obtained include 
the total value of the issue, the number of  shares issued in the case of equity, 
and the type of debt or equity issued (e.g., preferred, common, subordinated). 
For companies with a listed issue date but no announcement date, the an- 
nouncement date was  obtained when  possible from the Wall Street Journal 
Zndex. The sample does not include companies that announce an issue but then 
do not follow through with it. 
1.3.2  Volume of Equity Issues over Time 
The time-series pattern of external financing in the property-casualty  indus- 
try can be related to potentially explanatory variables such as changes in firm 
and industry net worth, stock market returns, and economy-wide financing be- 
havior. Table 1.1 shows the number of  firms issuing equity each year and the 
total dollar value of issues, while figure 1.8 shows the annual dollar volume of 
equity issues as a fraction of industry net worth. For all series the data display 
two peaks: a larger peak at 1985-86  and a smaller peak at 1971-72.  These 
correspond to two of the three periods of high price and restricted output. In 
the third period in which industry data suggest a capital shortage, 1975-76, 
there is not such a clear peak. While total equity offered relative to industry 
net worth increases slightly in 1976, the number of firms issuing equity is not 
significantly different from other years. As with the earlier series, the activity 
during the 1980s is significantly greater than that of the preceding period. 
The question arises of whether insurers issue more during certain periods 
because of conditions particular to the property-casualty industry, or whether 14  Anne Gron and Deborah Lucas 
Table 1.1  Equity and Debt Issues 
No. of  Value of Equity Issues  No. of Debt  Value of Debt Issues 
Year  Equity Issues  (million $)  Issues  (million $) 
1970  1  3.5  3  172.2 
1971  14  191.9  2  26.1 
1972  18  313.1  5  130 
1973  1  0.6  3  213.3 
1974  0  0  2  200.4 
1975  0  0  1  0.4 
1976  2  78.8  3  1  05 
1977  4  15.6  4  103.6 
1978  5  23.1  4  157.3 
1979  0  0  2  22.7 
1980  4  72  3  66.9 
1981  2  35.2  3  116 
1982  2  71.5  5  241.5 
1983  7  404.5  4  322.8 
1984  4  222.7  2  99.8 
1985  29  2,787.9  9  947.5 
1986  29  3,067.5  15  1,816.6 
1987  6  386  12  1,369.7 
1988  4  69.5  13  1,443 
1989  1  15.5  7  1,445.3 
1990  4  272  1  99.9 
1991  6  669.3  15  1,813 
1992  14  1,968.5  11  1,338.2 
1993  14  860.9  13  1,408.6 
they were simply following broad-based financing trends in the market. For 
industrial firms, the volume of equity issues varies substantially  over time, with 
the bulk of issues clustered in “hot” market periods. One prominent character- 
istic of hot market periods is that aggregate stock market returns are above av- 
erage. 
To examine whether property-casualty  issues are clustered with those of in- 
dustrial issuers, we use the classification of historical hot and cold market peri- 
ods identified by Bayless and Chaplinsky (1994). For their sample of industrial 
firms they find that 60 percent of the issues occur in hot periods (28 percent of 
the months considered) while only 13 percent of the issues occur in cold peri- 
ods (29 percent of these months). Why this pronounced clustering of equity 
issues occurs remains somewhat mysterious; some have attributed it to tempo- 
ral variations in adverse selection while others point to fads in financing mech- 
anisms and waves of market optimism. Whatever the explanation, the average 
stock price drop for industrial firms is lower during hot periods by  about 2 
percent, a substantial cost differential that appears to benefit hot.market issuers 
(Bayless and Chaplinsky 1994). For the 137 issues in our sample that occurred 
over this time period, 66 occurred in hot periods while only 10 occurred in 15  External Financing and Insurance Cycles 
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Fig. 1.8  Equity relative to net worth 
cold periods.I2  This suggests issue behavior temporally similar to other equity 
issuers and may explain the relatively low volume of issues in 1975-76  despite 
the apparent capital shortage in the property-casualty industry. 
1.3.3  Volume of Debt Issues over Time 
The time-series properties of  our sample of  debt issues is summarized in 
figures 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11. As with equity issues, the most activity occurs in 
1986, and there is more activity generally toward the end of  the period. In 
contrast to equity issues, however, the peaks of financing activity are less pro- 
nounced. Issue volume patterns also vary across debt maturities. Short-term 
debt issues are rare in the 1970s but are used quite frequently in the last five 
or six years of the period. Even in the later period, however, short-term debt 
accounts for a small fraction of total pr0~eeds.l~  The issue pattern of medium- 
term debt over time is similar to that for equity, with proceeds as a fraction of 
industry net worth peaking in 1971, 1976, and 1986. Notice that the issue vol- 
ume in 1976 is large relative to equity, perhaps because firms were substituting 
debt issues for equity issues in this cold market period. Long-term debt issues, 
like short-term issues, do not exhibit any particular correlation with industry- 
wide changes in net worth or market conditions. 
Data on long-term debt are also available from quarterly Compustat for 
many of the firms in the smaller sample examined in section 1.2. For compari- 
son, figure 1.12 shows the average percentage changes in long-term debt over 
the 1974-90 period for the Compustat firms (which number 12 in 1974 and 
12. The relatively large number of issues in 1992 and 1993 also appears to be consistent with 
13. This measure of  short-term debt does not include bank loans, which could be an important 
high overall issue volume in this period. 
source of additional short-term capital. 16  Anne Gron and Deborah Lucas 
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Fig. 1.10  Debt issues relative to net worth 
increase to 28 firms in  1989). As for the larger SDC sample, on  average 
changes to debt were positive but show no particular pattern in relation to the 
insurance cycle. Notice that the large percentage increases in the earlier part 
of the period reflect the low base of debt at that time. Figure 1.13 shows the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets over the same period, where total assets 
is measured as the sum of market equity and book liabilities. In this graph the 
increase in the ratio of debt to value in 1984-85 primarily reflects the drop in 
stock price rather than an increase in debt. 
As in the case of equity issues, it is difficult to disentangle  increases in exter- 
nal financing due to events particular to the property-casualty industry from 

















Fig. 1.11  Debt by maturity 
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Fig. 1.12  Changes in debt 
middle to late 1980s is consistent with large economy-wide increases in lever- 
age, due in part to the more favorable tax treatment of debt following the Tax 
Reform Act of  1986. 
1.3.4  Evaluating the Importance of External Finance 
As we have seen, the observed pattern of  debt and equity issues is consistent 
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Fig. 1.14  Growth in industry net worth 
but it could also be attributed to broader market trends. To evaluate the quanti- 
tative importance of external finance in offsetting the cycle, we compare the 
total amount of externally generated financing to changes in total net worth. 
The annual growth in real net worth for the industry is shown in figure 1.14. 
Negative-growth years are 1969, 1973, 1974, 1981, 1984, 1990, 1992, where 
the last two are quite close to zero. High-growth years generally follow those 
with negative growth and include 1971, 1972, 1975, 1976, 1985, and  1986. 
The use of  external financing is actually greater in these high-growth years, 
which might be explained by  the lead time needed to arrange an issue. The 
delay could also arise if insurers wait for the market to recognize the potential 
for profitable expansion before issuing. Interestingly, the amount of total capi- 
tal raised in equity and debt markets is not large relative to the total increase 
in net worth in these years. The ratio of total debt and equity funds generated 19  External Financing and Insurance Cycles 
to the increase in stock insurers’ net worth is 13 percent in 1970,4 percent in 
1976, and 33.6 percent in 1985. Of  course, the amounts raised represent a 
much larger fraction of the net worth of the issuing firms. 
To  evaluate whether the relationship between issues and capacity is statisti- 
cally significant, we performed the regression analysis presented in table 1.2. 
For both equity and debt issues, we examined three measures: the number of 
issues, the real value of funds issued, and the value of funds issued relative to 
industry net worth at the beginning of the year. Our explanatory variables are 
capacity at the beginning of the year, measured as industry net worth as of the 
beginning of the year divided by the five-year historical average, and the ratio 
of industry liabilities to assets, as of the beginning of the year.I4  The results in 
table 1.2 show there is a negative relationship between industry capacity and 
the various measures of  equity financing. This relationship is generally sig- 
nificant at or above the  15 percent confidence level. In addition, there is a 
positive relationship between measures of equity financing and the ratio of 
liabilities to assets at the beginning of the period, although this relationship is 
less precisely measured. On the other hand, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between capacity and measures of debt financing. Debt financing, 
like equity financing, is positively related to industry leverage as measured by 
liabilities relative to assets. 
An often-cited “capacity” statistic in the industry is the ratio of  premium 
revenue to net worth. This ratio reflects the industry’s leverage in terms of pre- 
mium revenue. Under the assumption that premium revenue primarily reflects 
the expectation of uncertain claims costs, this ratio reflects expected costs rela- 
tive to the funds available if  realized costs exceed their expectations. If there 
is some maximum ratio of premium revenue to net worth and if insurers are at 
or near that limit after declines in net worth, then the percentage increase in net 
worth following a security issue translates into the same percentage increase in 
premium revenue supported. As seen from the discussion above, the increase 
in premium revenue that can be supported by the externally generated funds is 
relatively small for all years but 1985-87. 
1.4  The Announcement Effect of Equity and Debt Issues 
As discussed earlier, there are significant direct and indirect costs to security 
issues that can discourage firms from financing otherwise attractive investment 
opportunities. Direct costs  include underwriters’ fees,  SEC  filing require- 
ments, distribution costs, bank charges, and so on. The largest indirect cost, 
usually associated with the issue of risky securities such as equity, is the nega- 
tive market price reaction to the announcement of an issue. The argument that 
high-price, restricted-output periods in the property-casualty industry are due 
to capital shortages implicitly rests on the idea that raising capital is prohibi- 
14. Industry data are from Best‘s Aggregates and Averages, as described in section 1.2. Table 1.2  External Financing and Industry Capacity 
Dependent Variables 
No. of  Real Value of  Value of  Equity Issues /  No. of  Real Value of  Value of Debt Issues / 
Explanatory Variable  Equity Issues  Equity Issues  Net Worth  Debt Issues  Debt Issues  Net Worth 
Capacity  -13.54  -  1,47  1.68  -.017  -3.50  -455.30  -  ,006 
(-1.54)  (-1.69)  (- 1.72)  (-31)  ( -  .82)  (- 1.12) 
Liability / assets  49.58  7,612.00  .06  58.61  6,530.88  .03 
R2  .13  .2 1  .16  .33  .21  .ll 
(1.33)  (2.06)  (  1.45)  (3.20)  (2.79)  (1.43) 
Nores: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. All regressions have 24 observations. 21  External Financing and Insurance Cycles 
tively expensive as a result of  these direct and indirect costs. To see whether 
there is evidence of unusually high financing costs, in this section we measure 
the stock price reaction to insurance company issues of debt and equity and 
compare the reaction to that for other financial and industrial firms. 
1.4.1  Equity Issues 
We  focus primarily on equity issues because they provide capital in a form 
that is clearly acceptable to regulators and because they are a relatively expen- 
sive form of  financing. Not only are there significant direct costs involved in 
equity issues, estimated to range from 1 to 5 percent of  the value issued, but 
issuers typically experience a significant drop in their stock price as well. 
One commonly accepted explanation for the announcement-day price drop 
is that asymmetric information between managers and potential shareholders 
creates an adverse selection problem (Myers and Majluf 1984). Firms that real- 
ize their stock is overvalued have an incentive to issue additional stock since 
their current shareholders will benefit at the expense of the new buyers. Simi- 
larly, managers who believe their stock is undervalued will avoid issuing eq- 
uity. Potential buyers, realizing these incentives, react to the announcement of 
an equity issue as a signal that the stock is overvalued, and hence the market 
price falls. Consequently, many firms whose stock is not undervalued would 
forgo or postpone valuable investment opportunities or rely more on internal 
financing rather than issue equity at a depressed price.15 
Empirical studies of stock price behavior around equity issues (eg,  Masulis 
and Korwar 1986; Mikkelson and Partch 1986; Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDon- 
ald  1990) reveal a number of  regularities that are consistent with this basic 
adverse selection story. For industrial firms, stock prices fall an average of 2-3 
percent at the announcement of an issue. Following this, there is a further drop 
of about 0.5 percent for firms that follow through with an issue. Studies have 
also found that issuing firms have abnormally high returns in the months pre- 
ceding the announcement of an issue, an observation that also can be explained 
by the impact of adverse selection in a multiperiod setting (Lucas and McDon- 
ald 1990). More recent evidence suggests that issuing firms experience nega- 
tive abnormal returns in the three to five years after they issue, suggesting that 
the price drop at announcement underestimates the bad news associated with 
the average issue (Loughran and Ritter 1996). 
The price behavior for financial firms and utilities is somewhat different. 
For instance, the announcement-day stock price drop for public utilities is con- 
siderably lower than for industrial firms. The differential may be due to the 
facts that utilities issue more frequently so the announcement is more likely to 
be anticipated and that they have more easily observable investment projects. 
15. This argument presumes that undervalued firms have no way to credibly and inexpensively 
convey this information to the market. One might also argue that the price drop does not represent 
a cost to firms that are overvalued. Even for this group, however, firms acting in the interests of 
shareholders  who would prefer to see their stock at a higher price will be reluctant to issue. 22  Anne Gron and Deborah Lucas 
The fact that their rate of  return is regulated may also have an impact. In a 
study of  the banking industry, Cornett and Tehranian (1994) conjecture that 
the stock price reaction to equity issues by commercial banks will be more 
pronounced for “voluntary” than for “involuntary” issues, and they find some 
evidence supporting this claim. An involuntary issue is defined as occumng 
when the issuing bank is in violation of regulatory capital adequacy require- 
ments.  l6 
On a priori grounds it is not clear how the indirect costs of equity issues 
should be expected to change over the insurance cycle. In analogy to the case 
of commercial banks studied by Cornett and Tehranian (1994), one might ex- 
pect the stock price reaction to equity issues to be less negative during the 
high-price, constrained-supply phase because investors can observe the need 
for capital and the potential for profitable investment. This suggests that insur- 
ers would face relatively low costs of issuing equity in these periods, making 
it more puzzling that supply shortages persist. On the other hand, insurance is 
an information-intensive business, and it is plausible that managers have a 
much better idea of the value of their assets and liabilities than does the market. 
Even during a high-price, constrained-output phase, an equity issue could re- 
veal that a firm was hit with a particularly large number of costly claims or 
low asset returns, forcing it to go to the equity market. 
Results 
To assess the market price reaction to an insurer equity issue, we calculate 
abnormal returns over the 20-day window surrounding the announcement of 
an  equity  issue. The  abnormal return  is calculated as the  daily return  of 
the  issuing  company  minus  the  daily  return  of  a  value-weighted  market 
index.I7 These returns are taken from the Center for Research on  Security 
Prices (CRSP) data tapes, which provide information on NYSE/AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks. Of the 171 equity issue events obtained from SDC and after 
excluding brokerages, we were able to match 113 to CRSP data using CUSIP 
identification numbers. Cumulative abnormal returns were calculated by com- 
pounding the average daily abnormal returns over the 20-day window. 
On day  0 (the announcement day) the average price drop across the  113 
events for which data were available was 1.1 percent, with a standard deviation 
of  2.69 percent. Although the drop is not statistically significant, it is much 
larger than the typical daily abnormal return in other days in the event window, 
which never exceeds 0.45 percent. In contrast to previous studies on industrial 
firms, no apparent price drop is observed on day -1,  suggesting little informa- 
tion leakage prior to the announcement. The standard deviation of abnormal 
returns is fairly constant over the event window. Figure 1.15 summarizes the 
16. A parallel experiment for property-casualty insurers is complicated by the absence of a well- 
specified regulatory capital requirement. 
17. The results are unchanged if an  equally weighted index is used to calculate abnormal returns. 
It is also possible to calculate P-adjusted abnormal returns, but this requires more financial data 
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Fig. 1.15  Equity issues (cumulative abnormal returns) 
behavior of abnormal returns for issuing firms. As a robustness check, we also 
calculated the price reaction excluding firms that were classified as primarily 
brokerages or health and accident and including all firms for which data were 
available. The price drop and variance for the different samples were almost 
identical. 
Because of the small sample size, it is hard to draw strong conclusions about 
how this price reaction compares to that for other industries. It appears, how- 
ever, that the price drop is relatively small compared to the experience of indus- 
trial firms, which typically drop 2-3  percent in value. It is more similar to the 
price drop in response to bank equity issues of 1.56 percent for voluntary issues 
and 0.64 percent for involuntary issues found by Cornett and Tehranian (1994). 
This relatively small price drop exacerbates the puzzle of why insurers do not 
rely  more  on  external financing  during the high-price, constrained-supply 
phase of the insurance cycle. 
The Effect of  Market Climate 
Recall that many property-casualty industry issues occur during economy- 
wide hot market periods, and that for industrial firms the price drop is lower at 
these times. To  see whether insurers issuing in hot markets also gain a price 
advantage, we  divide the sample between "hot"  and "not hot"  issuers, again 
using the date classifications suggested by Bayless and Chaplinsky (1994)Y 








18. Because of the small number of issue events in each year,  it  is not possible to  identify 
systematic changes in the price drop over time more finely. 24  Anne Gron and Deborah Lucas 
In our sample 52 announcements occur in identified hot periods and 26 an- 
nouncements occur in not hot periods. Consistent with the findings for indus- 
trial firms, the average price drop for the hot market issuers was  only 0.7 
percent while for not hot market issuers the drop was  1.6 percent. For the 
unclassified post-October  1989  period, the average price drop for the 36 events 
in our sample is 1 percent. In none of the subperiods is the price drop statisti- 
cally significantly different from zero, although (with the exception of the hot 
market group) they are at least twice as large as the average price change on 
any other day in the 20-day window.I9 
Cross-Sectional InJuences 
The price  drop at issue announcement is potentially affected by  cross- 
sectional factors such as the size of the issue. In a regression of the price drop 
on issue size, however, no significant relationship was detected. 
1.4.2  Debt Issues 
In comparison to most other companies insurers have little ordinary debt in 
their capital structure. One explanation for this is that policyholders already 
have debtlike claims on a firm’s cash flows, making additional fixed obligations 
less attractive. Still, issuing debt that is junior to the claims of policyholders is 
a viable way to increase capital, particularly as a short-term  measure. For most 
firms issuing debt is a less costly alternative to issuing equity because of both 
lower direct costs and lower indirect costs. Indirect costs are lower because it 
is fairly easy for management and the market to agree on the value of a low- 
risk security such as debt. This implies that one would not expect to see a large 
price drop on the announcement of  a debt issue, a conjecture that has been 
confirmed by earlier empirical work on industrial firm issues. 
To see how the market responds to property-casualty  industry debt issues we 
follow the methodology of the previous section, computing average abnormal 
returns in the 20-day window centered on debt issue announcement days (see 
fig.  1.16). For the  82 debt issues for which announcement days could be 
matched to stock return data, the price drop on the announcement day averaged 
0.5 percent. As expected, the drop was statistically insignificant and similar in 
magnitude to abnormal returns on other days in the window. It appears that the 
market receives property-casualty  debt issues similarly to those of other firms. 
1.5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have explored the conjecture that the periodic episodes of 
high prices and constrained supply in the property-casualty industry are the 
19. It would be interesting to compare these statistics to the price response to issues in high- 
price, constrained-supply periods that do not correspond the hot market periods. Unfortunately 
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Fig. 1.16  Debt issues (cumulative abnormal returns) 
result of  temporary capital shortages. To  do this we looked for increases in 
activities aimed at increasing capital at these times: dividend cuts, repurchase 
cuts, equity issues, and debt issues. We also looked for evidence that the costs 
of  raising external capital are unusually high relative to other industries by 
examining the market price response to security issues. 
There is some evidence of payout policy changes in the expected direction, 
and also of  an increased volume of  debt and equity issues following low- 
capacity periods. The total amount of  capital obtained by  security issues or 
reduced payouts, however, appears to be small relative to the observed drops 
in net worth, suggesting that insurers rely primarily on future retained earnings 
to rebuild their capital positions. When property-casualty insurers do go to the 
capital markets we find no evidence that they receive an unusually poor recep- 
tion. In fact, the market price reaction to equity issues appears to be consider- 
ably less negative than for industrial issuers, but similar to that for banks and 
utilities. 
These findings make the seeming reluctance of property-casualty insurers to 
rely more heavily on external capital markets somewhat surprising and suggest 
several possibilities to be explored in future research. One interpretation of our 
evidence is that the cycle should not be attributed to periodic shortages of 
capital, but instead to another factor(s) that remains to be identified. For in- 
stance, one explanation of the cycle that does not rely on capital market imper- 
fections is that premiums rise in response to new information about expected 
cost increases. Changes in loss distributions produce large reductions in indus- 
try net worth, and insurers update their estimates of expected claims and in- 
crease prices accordingly. Since current cost data do not fully reflect this new 
information, the relation between industry capacity and  operating margins 
temporarily shifts. Under this alternative hypothesis, we would not expect in- 
surers’ cost of external financing to be unusually high, nor would insurance 
prices necessarily increase with low capital. 
On the other hand, although the incorporation of  new  public information 26  Anne Gron and Deborah Lucas 
into prices may be a factor in the cycle, new information alone is unlikely to 
explain a number of phenomena that appear to be related to the cost of capital 
or other asymmetric information problems. For one, periods of high prices also 
appear to be periods of rationing. The fact that insurers temporally concentrate 
their equity issues during periods in which other firms are issuing equity and 
in periods following an increase in industry profitability also suggests that 
asymmetric information is a factor. 
A second possibility is that the costs of raising external capital are much 
higher than the observed price reactions to equity issues suggest, particularly 
for the firms that choose not to issue securities. A shortcoming of our method 
is that we can only observe costs for the firms that find it profitable to go ahead 
with an issue, and even in this case we rely on an indirect measure of the costs 
(i.e., the market price response). Several aspects of the data do point toward 
high costs: the propensity of firms to issue in hot markets, the somewhat higher 
cost of issuing in cold markets, and the small volume of equity and debt is- 
sues overall. 
Finally, an interesting trend in the data is the significant increase in the use 
of debt and equity issues by insurers over time. If capital availability did play 
a major role in past fluctuations, we  would expect to see less pronounced 
cycles in the future as the size and informational efficiency of capital markets 
continue to increase. 
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